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Abstract: The protection of information against electromagnetic penetration has huge significance. Diﬀerent solutions,
technological or organizational, are used to protect the information-limiting levels of unintentional emissions.

In

particular, technological solutions are implemented in commercial devices to limit levels of electromagnetic emissions.
Nevertheless, such solutions cannot always be used. This is connected with the construction of these devices. Very often
the devices do not have enough space on the inside to install new elements such as filters, electromagnetic shielding,
and others. In the paper a new solution is proposed. The solution does not change the construction of the devices
(e.g., printers, screens). The new method is based on computer fonts called TEMPEST fonts (safe fonts). In contrast
to traditional fonts (e.g., Arial or Times New Roman), the new fonts are devoid of distinctive features. Without these
features the characters of the new fonts are similar each other. At the output of the information infiltration channel the
characters of the TEMPEST fonts limit the possibilities of recognition of characters that appear on the reconstructed
image. The image is reconstructed based on an electromagnetic emission, which is correlated with the process information.
In this paper the dominance of the TEMPEST fonts over the traditional fonts and Sang Mun fonts in the protection
of information against electromagnetic penetration is demonstrated. The TEMPEST fonts have wider use. They are
also resistant to optical character recognition programs. The use of the TEMPEST fonts in special systems allows the
safe processing of data while displaying them on the screen as well as printing them on laser printers, especially on laser
printers with LED slats.
Key words: Electromagnetic emission, safe computer font, protection of information, electromagnetic eavesdropping,
image and signal processing

1. Introduction: the state of the art
Data protection is an important element of each institution. Various solutions are used to prevent the risk of
loss of such data. Limited access to oﬃce space is the most frequently used method (organizational methods
[1,2]). Access to the Internet is limited in the case of computer workstations. However, electronically processed
information could be intercepted in a noninvasive way. The process of noninvasive data acquisition does not
leave any traces [3–6]. You do not find out about it until the information is disclosed.
Electromagnetic emission correlated with the processed data has to occur in the case of the mentioned
phenomenon. The most important case in this regard consists of the possibility of intercepting data and
presenting them in a form that is comprehensible and legible for a person. In particular, this concerns emission
sources that process data in a graphic form. Such sources are VGA and DVI standard transmission lines [7–10].
The laser systems of typical laser printers could also be such sources of emission [11–14].
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Given the possibility of acquisition of presented data (graphic data) in a noninvasive way, the sources of
the electromagnetic emission correlated with the data are subject to particular analysis and protection. The best
and most versatile solutions are sought for all sources of revealing emissions. One of the most eﬀective methods
consists of shielding every element of IT equipment that could be a potential source of sensitive emission [2].
However, given the purchase price and appearance of such equipment, other more user-friendly solutions are
sought. One of the suggested methods consists of filtering video signals (Figure 1 [15,16]).

Figure 1. Filtering of the video signal – VGA standard.

Markus Kuhn suggested this approach to the problem [15,16]. He brings forward the concept of using
a filtering system assembled on the output video port (VGA standard) of, e.g., a computer central unit. Of
course, this produces the desired eﬀect. Kuhn limits over 50% of signal spectrum. Given the rejection of higher
components of the spectrum of the measured sensitive emission signal, it is practically not measurable. In this
case the observed letters on an “eavesdropped” monitor are significantly blurred. It is tiresome to read the
signs. However, a very important aspect should be noted here. Such a solution is not versatile. It could be
used for analogue systems such as the VGA standard. Moreover, a change of resolution of the displayed image
results in changed parameters of the vision signal. Using the same filter for all image resolutions is not going to
be eﬀective. In this case the use of an adaptive filter is necessary, for every resolution of the displayed image.
A digital standard such as DVI has other characteristics that make it impossible to introduce significant
changes to the spectrum of the signal. In this case false pixels could occur and a monitor could switch oﬀ in
extreme cases. Therefore, the desired eﬀect is not reached. In the case of the DVI standard a combination of
colors of letters and backgrounds could be used for a higher level of electromagnetic protection of the processed
data [7,15]. The USB standard oﬀers similar properties. It is used for work with, e.g., a laser printer. In this
case a solution in the form of signal filtering cannot be used [2] to prevent electromagnetic infiltration of the
printing device.
Sang Mun suggests another solution [17,18]. His method is based on a computer font, in which individual
letters and digits are enriched with additional elements (e.g., noise; Figure 2). The Arial font is the basis for the
set of fonts. It is easily identified in the electromagnetic infiltration process. The primary purpose of Sang Mun
fonts is to prevent the eﬀectiveness of optical character recognition (OCR) programs. The possibility of using
fonts in electromagnetic protection of processed text data was verified. In this case, the method of correlation
between signs at the output of a radiated type of information infiltration channel (IIC) was used. It turns out
that for very weak signals and poor legibility of presented signs the correlation method is likely to indicate
correct signs.
The Null Pointer font is another solution that could be deemed eﬀective in counteracting electromagnetic
infiltration (Figure 3 [19]). It is a generally available commercial font. It has some characteristics of a solution
described in the article. Individual characters have vertical and horizontal lines with various widths. However,
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Figure 2. The characters of Sang Mun Noise font.

the structure of characters shows no consistency. This primarily relates to the diversity of line widths that allow
identification of a given sign easily. The correlation method used in the analysis allows to clearly identify the
sought characters in a presented image.

Figure 3. The characters of the Null Pointer font.

The electromagnetic protection of processed text information based on safe fonts [17,20] was also proposed.
This is a highly versatile solution that protects text data against electromagnetic infiltration regardless of the
source of the sensitive emission: DVI digital standard, VGA analogue standard, single or double diode system
of laser printers, or printers with a LED slat [14]. Moreover, safe fonts prevent use of OCR programs. Direct
transfer from paper version to electronic version is practically impossible.
2. The essence of safe computer fonts
The design of safe fonts takes into account the characteristics of a radiated-type IIC. This is a high-pass filter
described by the following relation:
x′ (t) = lim

∆t→0

x (t + ∆t) − x (t)
+ s(t),
∆t

(1)

where x′ (t) is signal x(t) on the output of the IIC, x(t) is the signal of the revealing emission on the input of
the IIC, and s(t) is noise and disturbances coming from natural sources and from sources built by man.
Therefore, presented images based on revealing emission signals include only vertical and diagonal edges
of graphic elements. They correspond to beginnings and ends of electrical impulses that decide about displaying
appropriate shapes of signs on a monitor. Taking this characteristic into account, a safe font called Asymmetrical
Safe was proposed, with shape shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. The characters of Asymmetrical Safe font.

The design of a safe font is based on the concept of maximizing similarity between individual characters.
Lack of certain elements of structural characters makes it likely to be recognized as a diﬀerent alphabetic
character. Distinctive features of characters at IIC input might disappear at its output. Therefore, a given
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character might be recognized as a diﬀerent one. Such phenomenon exists for each source of sensitive emission
identified as a source of emission processing data in a graphic form (screen – VGA (DVI) standard, laser printer
(one and two-diode laser system and LED slat)). This was the purpose of developing a font that would allow
for secure processing of text data from the electromagnetic infiltration eﬀectiveness point of view.
Each character of letters and digits of the font is built of various widths of vertical and horizontal lines.
Some basic characteristics of two-element writing have been retained:
• a narrower vertical line exists only on the right side of the characters (vertical line) and in their upper
and lower parts (horizontal lines);
• a wide vertical line exists only on the left side of a character;
• none of the characters bear any decorative elements (Figure 5).
This allows standardization of the font characters while maintaining suﬃcient legibility.

Figure 5. Letter elements.

Very high-class receivers are used in tests of TEMPEST devices (screens and printers). One of them is
the DSI-1550A measurement system (Dynamic Sciences Corporation, range of frequencies: 10 kHz to 22 GHz,
BW = up to 200 MHz; Figure 6). The video output of the receiver allows recording of the revealing emission
signals. This is, however, an absolute value of the signal. That is why presented images show positive impulses
marking the mentioned vertical and diagonal edges of characters, pursuant to the following relation [2]:
x′′ (t) = lim

∆t→0

x (t + ∆t) − x (t)
+ s (t) .
∆t

(2)

During the tests the distance between the receiving antenna and the source (monitor or laser printer) of
revealing emissions was equal to 1 m in accordance with the MIL-STD-461F “Requirements for the control
of electromagnetic interference. Characteristics of subsystems and equipment”, in an anechoic chamber. In this
way, the source of emission was separated from additional, unwanted sources of electromagnetic disturbances.
The used computer was of the TEMPEST class. The sensitive emissions were measured at frequencies of 525
MHz and 685 MHz and for the measuring band BW = 20 MHz. Signal sampling frequency was equal to
15 Ms/s. The displayed and printed document contained signs written in the Arial font. In order to establish
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Figure 6. TEMPEST test system R-1550A.

the suitability of safe fonts in the protection of processed electromagnetic information, the research was also
conducted for signs written in the Asymmetrical Safe font.
The design of individual characters was based on the concept of making them as similar to each other
as possible while also making them distinguishable, which allows for smooth reading. Moreover, widths of the
characters should not be diﬀerent from widths of characters in traditional fonts: Arial and Times New Roman.
This guarantees compliance with the basic statistical data concerning the number of characters with spaces per
sheet of paper [17].
The tests of revealing emission during text data processing were carried out conducted in ideal measurement conditions (inside the anechoic chamber; Figure 7). The real conditions improve the level of electromagnetic protection of processed data.

Figure 7. Measuring system inside of the anechoic chamber.

3. Character correlation coeﬃcient of computer font characters
The usefulness of special computer fonts in the processing of information and counteraction of electromagnetic
infiltration was assessed based on visual analysis. This results from the fact that the graphic line of the device
is a source of sensitive emission signals. The visual analysis can be supported by a correlation analysis and
character error rate (CER) values estimated based on a character correlation coeﬃcient [21]. The character
correlation coeﬃcient measured for individual characters is calculated for appropriate fragments of the analyzed
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image including the searched characters and the pattern image including the searched character, pursuant to
the following relation:
N∑
w −1

M∑
w −1

n=0

m=0

Rj,i = √
z

N∑
w −1 M∑
w −1
n=0

(xn+j·Nw ,m+i·Nw − x̄j,i ) × (yn,m − ȳ)
2

(xn+j·Nw ,m+i·Mw − x̄j,i ) ×

m=0

N∑
w −1 M∑
w −1
n=0

,
(yn,m − ȳ)

(3)

2

m=0

where:
x̄j,i =

N∑
w −1
1
Nw · Mw n=0

ȳ =

M∑
w −1

xn+j·Nw ,m+i·Mw ,

(4)

m=0

N∑
w −1 M
w −1
∑
1
yn,m ,
Nw · Mw n=0 m=0

(5)

and
0 ≤ j ≤ b – 1; 0 ≤ i ≤ d – 1; b = Na / Nw – number of rows of correlation image; d = Ma / Mw –
number of columns of correlation image; xn,m – pixel amplitude of analyzed image; yn,m – pixel amplitude of
pattern image (single character of computer font); Ma – number of columns of analyzed image; Na – number
of rows of analyzed image; Mw – number of columns of pattern image; Nw – number of rows of pattern image;
i – column number of correlation image; m – column number of pattern image; j – row number of correlation
image; n– row number of pattern image.
Eq. (3) is correct for the character correlation calculated at both the input and output of the IIC. High
Z

R values (taking into account suﬃcient recognizability of characters and their legibility at the input of the IIC)
make distinctive features of given characters partly disappear at the output of the IIC. Consequently, visually
recognizing characters at the output of the IIC becomes impossible and RZ values do not allow to correctly
mark a character in a location where it exists. In this case, there are high CER values.
The character correlation coeﬃcient values calculated according to Eq. (3) for the analyzed fonts are
shown in Tables 1–3 and Figure 8.
Table 1. The number of relationships between the font characters on the output of the IIC for which the values of
correlation coeﬃcients RZ are included in the suitable ranges of similarity – laser system of laser printer as a source of
sensitive emissions.

Value of character
correlation
coeﬃcient RZ
0.0 ≤ RZ < 0.2
0.2 ≤ RZ < 0.4
0.4 ≤ RZ < 0.7
0.7 ≤ RZ < 0.9
0.9 ≤ RZ ≤ 1.0

Number of relationships
Asymmetrical
Arial
Safe
0
44
18
94
157
110
78
5
0
0

Times New
Roman
46
107
97
3
0

Sang Mun
Noise
119
122
12
0
0

Null
Pointer
52
190
11
0
0
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Table 2. The number of relationships between the font characters on the output of the IIC for which the values of
character correlation coeﬃcients RZ are included in the appropriate ranges of similarity – VGA line as a source of
sensitive emissions.

Value of character
correlation
coeﬃcient RZ
0.0 ≤ RZ < 0.2 1)
0.2 ≤ RZ < 0.4 2)
0.4 ≤ RZ < 0.7 3)
0.7 ≤ RZ < 0.9 4)
0.9 ≤ RZ ≤ 1.0 5)
1)
5)

Number of relationships
Asymmetrical
Times New
Arial
Safe
Roman
0
125
126
6
77
84
125
48
43
110
3
0
12
0
0

Lack of relationship, 2) weak relationship,
very strong relationship.

3)

moderate relationship,

Sang Mun
Noise
191
57
5
0
0
4)

Null
Pointer
0
67
155
29
2

rather strong relationship,

Table 3. The number of relationships between the font characters on the output of the IIC for which the values of
correlation coeﬃcients RZ are included in the suitable ranges of similarity – DVI line as a source of sensitive emissions.

Value of character
correlation
coeﬃcient RZ
0.0 ≤ RZ < 0.2
0.2 ≤ RZ < 0.4
0.4 ≤ RZ < 0.7
0.7 ≤ RZ < 0.9
0.9 ≤ RZ ≤ 1.0

Number of relationships
Asymmetrical
Arial
Safe
0
25
46
137
171
90
36
1
0
0

Times New
Roman
43
152
58
0
0

Sang Mun
Noise
107
144
2
0
0

Null
Pointer
45
190
18
0
0

The level of similarity between signs is diﬀerent for each font. Therefore, the values of the character
correlation coeﬃcient were divided for five ranges: lack of relationship (0.0 ≤ RZ < 0.2), weak relationship
(0.2 ≤ RZ < 0.4), moderate relationship (0.4 ≤ RZ < 0.7), rather strong relationship (0.7 ≤ RZ < 0.9), and
very strong relationship (0.9 ≤ RZ ≤ 1.0). This allows carrying out the quantitative analysis of values of the
character correlation coeﬃcient belonging to each range mentioned above. A large number of values belonging
to the moderate relationship, rather strong relationship, and very strong relationship ranges is very positive
from the point of view of electromagnetic protection of information. In this case the recognition of signs could
not be correct, in contrast to the Arial font for which the values of the character correlation coeﬃcient first
of all belong to the lack of relationship and weak relationship ranges. It allows recognizing almost every sign
because it has strong distinctive features.
The obtained values of the character correlation coeﬃcient for the safe font are substantially diﬀerent
than the values calculated for traditional font characters and for Sang Mun font and Null Pointer font. The safe
font characters are more similar, which has a direct influence on errors in attempts to find a correct character
in noisy images. Characters of traditional and Sang Mun fonts having characteristic decorative elements that
could be much more easily identified in spite of distortion of the regularity of their shapes. Font Null Pointer
cannot be classified as a safe font in spite of having some characteristics of one. The structure of individual
characters lacks consistency in appropriate proportions of line thickness and their locations.
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Figure 8. The values of character correlation coeﬃcient RZ for appropriate ranges of similarity: a) VGA standard, b)
DVI standard, c) laser printer with dual diode of laser system.

4. Character error rate
Visual analysis is a basic method classifying emission sources in the form of graphic lines in tests of eﬀectiveness
of the electromagnetic infiltration process [22–24]. However, the method is support by computer analysis. The
589
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correlation method is the most frequently used one. CER is its measure. It defines the relation between the
number of incorrectly recognized or unrecognized characters and the number of all characters found in an image.
Determining CER values was limited to traditional fonts and the safe font.
Let’s assume that r is number of characters existing in the analyzed image, c is number of characters
incorrectly recognized, e is number of characters correctly recognized, k is number of characters unrecognized
but wanted (k = r – e), and f is number of all characters existing in the analyzed image. Then:
CER =

c+k
c + (r − e)
=
.
f
f

(6)

For the purpose of analyses it was assumed that r = 31. Then f = 651. Thirty-one characters were randomly
located in a matrix of size 21 × 31. Examples of fragments of analyzed images are shown in Figure 9. Of course
the quality of the images is very poor. This results from the fact that they are obtained using the rasterization
method of very weak revealing emission signals. However, we can notice that Arial font characters could be
distinguished in contrast to the safe font characters.

Figure 9. Fragments of analyzed images containing characters of letters for a) Asymmetrical Safe font, b) Arial font
(SNR = SNR DV I 3, SNR DV I 3 < SNR DV I 2 < SNR DV I 1).

CER values for selected letters of the analyzed fonts at the output of the IIC for emission sources in the
form of DVI, VGA video standard, and a laser printer with two-diode laser system are given in Table 4.
Some characters, for example “c”, “e”, “n”, “o”, “s”, and “u”, have high CER values unlike the others. It
applies to the safe font. For this font the values between the mentioned signs and others are very high. Then for
the accepted criterion the correct sign cannot be recognized. The determined value of the character correlation
coeﬃcient is this criterion. Because the correlation between signs of the safe font is very high, we could take
three types of decisions that have an influence on values of CER:
• the correct recognition of a sign;
• the incorrect recognition of a sign;
• failure to recognize a sign.
5. Conclusions
This article presents a so-called safe computer font as a solution for counteracting electromagnetic eavesdropping.
The suggested solution was compared to the existing solutions in the form of video signal filtration (Kuhn’s
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Table 4. Values of CER ( × 10 −3 ) for characters on the output of the IIC for diﬀerent sources of revealing emissions
and for SNR DV I 3.

Character
a
b
c
e
l
n
o
p
r
s
u
y
z
1)

Arial font,

VGA
A1)
3
1
3
1
3
112
70
68
4
3
19
3
1
2)

standard
B2) C3)
3
96
159 83
48
824
12
724
3
25
109 527
2
589
3
89
202 809
5
559
8
430
3
21
2
239

DVI
A1)
2
5
60
60
18
40
80
46
22
23
11
6
9

Times New Roman font,

standard
B2) C3)
3
25
5
58
17
661
14
344
8
20
17
404
65
487
14
12
6
114
3
141
8
570
5
204
54
100
3)

Laser
A1)
5
0
73
7
143
49
32
3
34
2
5
0
5

printer
B2) C3)
7
589
14
115
24
654
14
715
8
278
87
443
51
693
5
178
27
615
2
640
14
438
2
76
5
418

Asymmetrical Safe font.

solution), Sang Mun Noise font, Null Pointer font, and the changes of colors of background and alphabet
characters.
The comparisons consisted of an attempt to identify the characters included in the images reconstructed
from the revealing emission signals. In each case the font characters, except the characters of the safe font,
were identifiable using the visual method or the correlation method. The characters of the safe font are very
poorly identifiable due to the elimination of distinctive features of characters. Thus, the reconstruction of the
text data was impossible. CER values confirmed the eﬀectiveness of the safe font (Asymmetrical Safe font) in
electromagnetic protection of processed text data.
The filtration of the video line resulting in narrowing of a signal spectrum could be eﬀective in particular
for the VGA analogue standard. This standard is not very sensitive to changes of signal shapes. In the case
of the DVI digital standard the filter application on the output of a graphic card results in the display of false
pixels or a monitor switching oﬀ. Analogical eﬀects could be observed during the operation of laser printers.
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